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Chaparro (Osbaldo) v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op 68 (Nov. 10, 2021)1 
 
 ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE HEARINGS: A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 




 The Court answered if a defendant’s right to be present was violated when the sentencing 
hearing was conducted via Zoom videoconferencing because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
Court concluded that the defendant’s sentencing hearing was just considering the surrounding 
circumstances, and that he was not entitled to relief. The Court also found that the admitted 
evidence of the defendant’s previous conviction was proper and that district courts should not 
categorically limit questions about jurors’ views concerning whether a defendant has prior 
convictions. Additionally, the Court held that inconclusive evidence can be relevant and 
admissible when used to show that an investigation was thorough or is presented to complete a 
story regarding a particular piece of evidence. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 On December 17, 2016 in the early morning, L.L. was walking in downtown Reno towards 
the Harrah’s casino when Chaparro grabbed her. Chaparro groped her buttocks and breasts, and 
digitally penetrated her. L.L. struggled and yelled that she would call 9-1-1. When L.L.’s friend 
approached, Chaparro quickly left. L.L. reported the assault, underwent a sexual assault exam, and 
the Harrah’s security system captured footage of the assault. 
 Chaparro was charged with sexual assault, battery with the intent to commit sexual assault 
upon a victim age 16 or older, and open or gross lewdness. The State moved to admit evidence of 
Chaparro’s prior conviction for battery with the intent to commit sexual assault where he groped 
and accosted P.J. in the parking lot of the Nugget Casino Resort. He opposed the motion arguing 
it was unfairly prejudicial, but the district court grated the motion and allowed P.J. to testify at 
trial. At trial, Chaparro argued that he neither penetrated L.L. nor intended to do so and was 
therefore innocent of the sexual assault and battery with intent charges. The jury convicted him of 
all charges in February 2020.  
 The COVID-19 pandemic required courts across the country to halt in-person hearings.2 
As a result, Chaparro’s sentencing hearing was held over Zoom on May 20, 2020. He joined the 
videoconference call from a jail courtroom and was able to communicate with counsel 
confidentially via headset and could see and hear the other participants. The only thing Chaparro 
could not see and hear were the members of the public who chose to watch including his friends 
and family. However, the members of the public could see and hear Chaparro throughout the 
duration of the hearing. Chaparro objected to the use of Zoom stating that he wanted to see his 
supporters, but the district court overruled the objection and proceeded with the hearing. The 
district court sentenced Chaparro to an aggregate sentence of life with parole eligibility after 12 
years. 
 
1  Jaden Braunagel 
2  See In re Second Judicial District Court’s Response to Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), Administrative Order 
2020-1 (Mar. 16, 2020); see also In re Second Judicial District Court’s Response to Coronavirus Disease (COVID-




Chaparro’s due process challenge to the sentencing hearing over Zoom 
 The first issue on appeal is whether Chaparro’s due process rights were violated by holding 
his sentencing hearing over Zoom. The Court acknowledged that because a sentencing hearing is 
a critical stage,3 a defendant has the right to be present for sentencing. But the court distinguished 
the right by stating that the right to present is not absolute.4 The Court noted that the presence of a 
defendant is a condition of due process that is limited such that a fair and just hearing would be 
prevented by the defendant’s absence.5 Therefore, considering whether Chaparro’s hearing was 
fair and just despite its deviation from the norm, the Court concluded that it was appropriate 
considering the circumstances of the pandemic. Chaparro was able to be heard, seen, speak, and 
confidentially communicate with counsel.6 The Court stated that the district court balanced 
Chaparro’s various rights appropriately, and acknowledged that the realities of the assessing the 
district court’s decision could not be separated from the circumstances in which the proceeding 
took place.7 
Chaparro also contended that his confrontation rights were violated. The Court declined to 
consider this claim by Chaparro because this claim was being raised for the first time on appeal.8 
Chaparro further argued that he had a right to the in-person presence of friends and family, but 
provided no supporting authority for the expansion of the right to be present to third parties. 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony regarding the prior assault 
and conviction 
The second issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in admitting testimony 
regarding the prior assault and conviction. In determining whether to admit a prior sexual offense 
pursuant to NRS 48.045(3), the district court must both make a preliminary finding that the prior 
sexual offense is relevant, and find that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the bad act constituting a sexual offense occurred.9 The Court then specified that a 
district court should evaluate whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice by considering five different factors.10 The Court 
disagreed with Chaparro that the evidence was not necessary to the State’s case and that the 
 
3  See Cunningham v. State, 94 Nev. 128, 130, 575 P.2d 936, 938 (1978). 
4  Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 367, 23 P.3d 227, 240 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 
127 Nev. 749, 263 P.3d 235 (2011). 
5  United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985); see Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 1000, 923 P.2d 1102, 
1115 (1996) (“The due process aspect has been recognized only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be 
thwarted by the defendant’s absence.”). 
6  Cf. People v. Lindsey, 772 N.E.2d 1286, 1276–79 (Ill. 2002) (holding the due process right was not violated where 
defendant participated in critical stages of arraignment and jury waiver by audiovisual transmission and “was able to 
interact with the court with relative ease,” and noting similar holdings by other state supreme courts). 
7  See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934) (“Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be 
fair, but fairness is a relative, not absolute, concept. It is the fairness with reference to particular conditions or 
particular results.”).  
8  See Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1260, 946 P.2d 1017, 1030 (1997) (declining to consider appellate claim where 
objection was not made below). 
9  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.045(3) (2020); Franks v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 1, 5, 432 P.3d 752, 756 (2019). 
10  Id. at 6, 432 P.3d at 756–57. 
probative value evaluation was in err. The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the evidence because it weighed the factors appropriately. 
 
The district court did not err in limiting voir dire 
 The third issue on appeal is whether Chaparro was improperly barred from asking 
prospective jurors questions regarding the effect that evidence of his prior conviction might have 
on their deliberation in his case. NRS 175.031 states that when conducting the initial examination 
of potential jurors, the defendant or their attorney as well as the district attorney are entitled to add 
to the examination by asking more question as the court deems appropriate.11 It also states that any 
further examination must not be unreasonably restricted.12 The Court recognized that purpose of 
voir dire is to determine whether jurors provide a fair and impartial trial,13 but also that the scope 
and method is within the district court’s discretion and they will review for an abuse of discretion 
or a showing of prejudice.14 
 The Court held on this issue that the district court appropriately limited Chaparro from 
inquiring into specific evidence that would be presented at trial because the line of questioning 
risked depriving Chaparro of an impartial jury.15 Here, the district court did not categorically 
obstruct questioning into the general issue of potential jurors’ views on defendants with previous 
convictions and thus it did not err.16 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony on inconclusive DNA evidence 
 The fourth issue on appeal was if the district court erred when it allowed evidence of a 
DNA tested pair of tights that the victim was wearing during the incident and the results were 
inconclusive. The Court ruled that when DNA test results are inconclusive, they can be relevant 
and probative to determining the reliability and sufficiency of the investigation.17 The Court further 
found that inconclusive evidence may be relevant to the State’s presentation of a complete story 
regarding a certain piece of evidence. So here, the Court held that the tights in question were 




 Finally, the Court determined whether there was cumulative error that denied Chaparro of 




11  NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.031 (2020). 
12  Id. 
13  Oliver v. State, 85 Nev. 418, 422, 456 P.2d 431, 434 (1969). 
14  Salazar v. State, 107 Nev. 982, 985, 823 P.2d 273, 274 (1991); Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 64, 17 P.3d 397, 
404 (2001). 
15  See Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 915, 921 P.2d 886, 892 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Nunnery, 127 
Nev. 749, 263 P.3d 235; see also Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 531 n.32, 188 P.3d 60, 70 n.32 (2008) (impliedly 
recognizing that it is error to ask a potential juror to prejudge the merits of the case); see also People v. Carasi, 190 
P.3d 616, 632 (Cal. 2008) (observing that voir dire seeks to uncover jurors’ views in the abstract to ensure that they 
will consider the facts with an open mind and that this aim is undermined by overly specific questions that expose 
the facts of the case). 
16  Id. at 632–33 (recognizing that district courts err in categorically limiting inquiry into case-specific issues). 




 The Court concluded that Chaparro was not denied a fair and just trail caused by the 
pandemic’s in-person restrictions, because he was provided with an appropriate alternative. The 
Court concluded on the issue of the admission of the prior conviction that the district court did not 
err. The Court ruled that district courts should not categorically limit inquiry during voir dire into 
jurors’ views regarding defendants with prior convictions, and that the district court here did not 
err when it barred inquiry into Chaparro’s specific prior conviction. Lastly, the Court affirmed the 
conviction and clarified that inconclusive DNA evidence can be admitted where it is relevant and 
is otherwise aligned with the rules of evidence. 
